COME ELECTIONS, THE NUKE DEAL WON’T BE ABLE TO HELP SINGH RETAIN HIS POSITION

Subhas Chandra Pattanayak

USA has since many years been conspiring to clamp its nuclear policies on India. Now it has got a great collaborator in Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

Antagonism to communism being their common creed, USA has always used Indian right-wingers to advance its interests in this country. The first organized political platform available to it was the Swatantra Party. When USA was admittedly busy in supplying arms to Pakistan to help it grab Kashmir by force, the founder of this party C. Rajgopalachari (Rajaji) had openly pleaded for transfer of Kashmir to Pakistan.

The Communists had aggressively foiled that evil design and peoples of India had so resolutely opposed Swatantra Party that its leaders had to extinguish it to save their own skin. This Party was obliterated from political scenario of India. But its Kashmir stand was a proof of how this rightist party was acting as agent of USA and trying to brainwash people to accept American hegemony.

The country had to suffer the trauma of witnessing assassination of Mrs. Indira Gandhi on October 31, 1984 when she was the Prime Minister for the fourth term and Mr. Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1991 when he was going to be the Prime Minister for the second term. Both of them were assassinated in manners as meticulous and mysterious as only a super power organization can plan and carry out.

When to many people, even though the alleged assassins in both the cases have been punished, the real brains behind the ghastly crimes are not yet taken to task, to everybody it is well known that both the assassinated leaders, in latter parts of their respective political careers, had emerged as strong obstacles to advancing tentacles of USA.

After Rajiv Gandhi was wiped out, his widow, now quite conspicuous with her support to the nuke deal that “is so clearly in interest of US of America”, stayed so stoic that the Congress party under utter confusion had to agree to P. V. Narasimha Rao taking over as the Prime Minister.

Rao created history by being sentenced to three years of rigorous imprisonment with Rs.100, 000 cash fine, convicted for criminal “conspiracy” and “abatement” in the ill-famed JMM Bribe Case filed by the CBI. He could escape the punishment due to prosecution’s lackluster response to his appeal in the high court level, but he shall remain forever a black spot on Indian democracy and people will always remember that he was sentenced as above for having committed offenses under Section 120b of the Indian Penal Code (criminal conspiracy) read with Sections 7, 12, 13(2) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act as well as substantive offenses under Section 12 for abetment to the crime of bribery. His was an offense against the country but he was not charged for that. He had committed this offense against the country in order only to remain in power.

His remaining in power with Manmohan Singh and Pranab Mukherjee as his aids in the cabinet was necessary for USA. Looking back to Mrs. Gandhi’s Prime Ministerial days would help understand this phenomenon.

Mrs. Gandhi’s political partnership with the Communist Party of India had defined India’s progress towards socialism so much that the Constitution of India in its Preamble acquired absolute clarity on its objectives by expanding “Sovereign Democratic Republic” to “Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic”.

For USA, epitome of imperialism, this was the most invincible hurdle in grabbing India. There was no scope to change the Preamble, because the Constitution of India is such formulated and worded that any provision thereof may be amended, but not the objective. And, amending the provisions for amendment of the Constitution is no more a matter of simple majority in Parliament. Therefore, a conspiracy was cooked up to sabotage the Preamble by rendering it inconsequential. Singh and Mukherjee helped Rao to carry out this conspiracy. Liberalization of Indian economy and opening up Indian market to foreign trade in the guise of economic reforms were the tools.

The nation has seen how Rao’s two ministers Manmohan Singh and Pranab Mukherjee, had proved very helpful to USA by signing on dotted lines and singing to its tune in matters of GATT and WTO and refusing to place details in the Parliament.

Disgusted of this foul play, peoples of India had rejected Congress in the general elections in May 1996; but in their regime, these agents of plutocracy had destroyed democratic equilibrium so savagely that electoral wisdom could not find a clear expression. The right-wingers took advantage of it and Vajpayee took over as the Prime Minister, though for the shortest period in Indian history. But, addition of his name in the succession list of Indian Prime Ministers helped BJP acquire power again at the end of a tumultuous phase of India’s parliamentary life under two successive Prime Ministers of Janata Dal, H.D.Deve Gowda and I.K.Gujral. With the right-wingers occupying power again, USA was encouraged to advance for netting in India to its nuclear design. Vajpayee had readily agreed.

Voters of India rejected Vajpayee when he was forced to seek a fresh mandate on which he could have proceeded to sign the nuke deal with USA. So, peoples of India, by refusing a fresh mandate to Vajpayee, had refused to accept American nuke proposals.

Manmohan Singh betrayed peoples’ mandate by signing the nuke deal with the USA. The people of India could only came to know of it when, not to the Parliament but to a journalist, he disclosed that the deal is “sealed, signed and non-negotiable” and as if fidgeting, simultaneously he declared, “It is an honourable deal, the cabinet has approved it, we cannot go back on it. I told them – the Communists – to do whatever they want to do, if they want to withdraw support, so be it,” (Singh’s interview published in the Telegraph on 11.8.2007)

Why did he fidget? It was because, he was eager to hide the Hyde Act from the peoples of India as the nuke deal is the offspring of this Act that has in-built mischief to control India’s independence in nuke programs and foreign relations. He fidgeted, because, he had made the deal “sealed, signed and non-negotiable” without consent of Indian Parliament, even though the consent was a must requirement to proceed with the deal. As the World Nuclear News divulged, for the deal to materialize, “The Indian Parliament must agree to the text” of the Hyde Act. But Singh did never place the Act before the Indian Parliament lest it may disagree to the text thereof and under pressure from business houses, made it “sealed, signed and non-negotiable”.

According to the President of Indo-US Business Council, Ron Somers, the American bill for the deal “lays the foundation for major trade and investment opportunities in India for U.S. companies. As many as 27,000 high-quality jobs each year each year for the next 10 years will be created in the U.S. nuclear industry alone.Reuters quoting US top source reported on August 25, 2007 that the deal is a “bonanza for US firms”. This suffices to have an idea of how business lobby mounted on Prime Minister Singh and steered him into signing the deal.

This being the position, the scenarios that we witnessed till withdrawal of leftists’ support was mere drama serials of hoodwinking Indian peoples.

After the withdrawal of leftists’ support, as live telecasted from the Lok Sabha Hall and as peoples of India deeply suspect, wads of slush money cultivated confidence votes for a Prime Minister that has helped USA succeed in clamping its nuclear policies on India.

Come the elections, the USA won’t be able to help Singh retain his position; one may safely predict it knowing Indians’ disposition.

DEMOCRACY IN INDIA IS IN DANGER: PRECIPITATORS ARE THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SPEAKER

Subhas Chandra Pattanayak

July 22, 2008 is held as the darkest day in Indian democracy.

This day Prime Minister Manmohan Singh won the confidence vote; but the day, instead of being counted as his victory day, is unambiguously held by one and all as the darkest day in Indian democracy.

In the life of India this day shall remain remarkable, not for victory of democracy, but for defeat of democracy.

What happened?

Ashok Argal, Faggan Singh Kulaste and Mahavir Bhagora, three BJP Members of Lok Sabha placed a bag on the table of the LS secretary general in front of the Speaker when debates on confidence motion were going on and fished out of it 10 bundles of currency notes of Rs.1000 denomination, claiming that the cash totaling a crore of rupees that they were placing on the table was given to them in advance against Rs.9 crore offered to them as bribe to create advantage for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The house was stunned and speechless. Deputy Speaker Charanjit Atwal had to adjourn the House hurriedly.

Later to tumults when it resumed, timeservers and renegades saved the government that should surely have breathed its last had the support for the Prime Minister could not have been arranged.

That the support was arranged is clear from the fact that the savers of Singh did not come out openly in his support prior to voting.

There is no evidence to show that political ideology played a role and change in ideological perception of persons who were opposing him till then, helped him bag the support he so badly needed.

This whips up suspicions that there was a secret deal behind the nuke deal.

Archana Nayak of Orissa had told TV channels, how she was offered money and whatever she should ask for in whatever forms she would prefer if only she votes for the government.

Her open allegation is most significant specifically as a few minutes after her statement the Lok Sabha witnessed how from a huge moneybag bundles of currency notes used allegedly to net in opposition support emanated to mock at the rampart of democracy.

So, obviously the support came not from politico-economic ideological reorientation, but from the moneybags pressed into action by agents of the Prime Minister.

This looks more certain as without the security check being slacked by the highest-level authority, such a huge bag stuffed with a crore of rupees could never have entered the Lok Sabha in session on the most sensitive issue since its birth.

As far as BJP members are concerned, it looks impossible on their part to have brought in such a huge bag to the Lok Sabha hall where everything was subjected to meticulous security check over and above the intelligence cover over each of them.

So, if the huge moneybag came from outside, it is normal to suspect that the agents of the Prime Minister had brought it in and in know of this, the security scrutinizers had deliberately allowed it or ignored its entry.

If the security staff did not neglect their duty and if the security scrutiny was not slacked, then it is impossible for the huge moneybag to have entered into the Lok Sabha from outside.

Then wherefrom such huge money came?

Obviously, in such circumstances, it may be suspected that the huge moneybag came from within the Lok Sabha premises and the huge money from the Lok Sabha chest.

If this must be the case, then the Speaker comes within the radar of suspicion.

Either way, the matter has shattered peoples’ faith in management of democracy. The peoples are doubly disturbed, as they doubt that the Prime Minister survived by use of moneybags.

Whether or not the Prime Minister survived by use of moneybags, this is too serious a doubt to be allowed to linger. The more time it takes to be eradicated the more damaging it will be to democracy being a factor of decline in voters’ confidence in the most important functionaries like the Prime Minister and the Speaker.

The Speaker would perhaps never have come into a state of being suspected. But knowingly or unknowingly he has allowed himself to be used by the Prime Minister or to the advantage of the Prime Minister, which has given birth to this decline.

Firstly, he should not have allowed a voteless debate over the issue in the Lok Sabha. To proceed ahead with the nuke deal, the prerequisite was, “the Indian Parliament must agree to the text” of the Hyde Act on the basis of which 123 agreement was to be signed. That we have published this prerequisite many a times in these pages indicates that the need for Indian parliament “to agree to the text” of the Hyde Act as a “must” was known to others and available to the knowledge of everybody. So, it was imperative for the Speaker to study and stress on this aspect. Had he insisted upon the need of the Lok Sabha “to agree to the text” of the Hyde Act as a “must”, the house could have debated on the “text” of that Act and “agreed (or disagreed) to the “text” thereof and the Prime Minister should have proceeded accordingly and the present debacle would never have occurred. That did not happen.

Secondly, the Speaker should have resigned from his post in honoring the party line. He was never an apolitical man to hold the post. He was there by virtue of being a member of the CPI(M) party, which had bagged the post for a party person by way of bargain in exchange of support to Congress-led UPA. When the party withdrew support, the Speaker should have relinquished the post the party had bagged in exchange of the support. But he did not do that. He gave two grounds. One, as Speaker he is apolitical and cannot be called for to act in party lines. Two, he cannot vote against the government as that would mean doing what the BJP would be doing and acting, even indirectly, in unison with a communal party like the BJP would be contrary to his political ideology as a communist. It was self-contradictory. Remaining apolitical cannot be the same as remaining antagonist to a particular political party. Moreover, for a communist, between imperialism and communalism, elimination of the former must be top priority and hence, ethically, there was no wrong in voting against the Prime Minister to save the country from imperialism, even if that meant working in unison with the communalists.

Thirdly, being the guardian of probity in Lok Sabha, he should not have allowed convicted criminals to come from prisons to vote on the confidence motion. Dismissal of members for violation of probity in raising questions in the House was a strong ground to disallow convicted criminals to participate in the vote. The dignity of the House was in severe jeopardy as TV channels showed the criminals to public as they were proceeding into the Parliament to participate in voting. Deliberate or not, the Speaker did not do anything discernible to uphold the dignity of the House in this case.

Fourthly, with money bundles to the tune of a crore of rupees hitting hard the House as the money used to purchase advantage for the Prime Minister and submission of the video records depicting such serious offence against the Lok Sabha, it was imperative on part of the Speaker to defer, in cause of probity and parliamentary dignity, the vote taking till the doubts were totally cleared on earnest investigation and the culprit or conspirator fully exposed. But the Speaker did not do that.

In the circumstances, one regrets to note that if democracy in India is in danger, precipitators are both the Prime Minister and the Speaker.

SINGH SURVIVED, DEMOCRACY DERANGED

Subhas Chandra Pattanayak

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh succeeded in arranging “yes” for American interest in nuke trade in India, but democracy deranged in the dirty process of confidence vote that he had to seek after withdrawal of support by the left parties on the nuke deal issue.

Evidently he organized his survival in power as a few number of lower house MPs who had been constantly opposing him apostatized themselves all on a sudden to his support and a few of the renegades absented themselves to reduce the number-load so that Singh should survive with lesser number of members in his pocket.

When 256 disciplined members consciously voted against him on their respective party lines, Singh bagged 275 votes in his support that included votes of defectors and timeservers even when as many as 10 members including the confused Trinamul Congress chief remained absent.

Had the three BJP MPs who displayed bundles of currency notes worth a crore of rupees in the Lok Sabha received in advance allegedly as bribe to support Singh decided to honor the offer, the number of timeservers in his side might have further increased and Singh might have bagged three more votes, with votes against him reduced by equal numbers.

But the three MPs, as they claim, took a TV channel to confidence and through it captured the venal act and then submitted the video record to the Speaker in his chamber and simultaneously displayed the slush money that Singh side had given them in the Hall of the House in front of everybody present.

The House was speechless, till finally voting time came.

PARLIAMENT SPEECHLESS AS CURRENCY BUNDLES BEFUDDLE DEBATES

Subhas Chandra Pattanayak

Reply of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to the debates on confidence vote has been postponed till 6.30 p.m. as bundles of crores worth currency notes allegedly offered to 3 members of BJP to purchase their support for the government hit the House and rendered it speechless much ahead of scheduled closure of debates.

Even as the government side is trying to strike over it a brush of conspiracy, BJP claims to have placed the proof before the Speaker as caught by reputed TV channel camera.

This is, either way, a black day in the life of Indian democracy, confess both the sides, notwithstanding how it affects the confidence vote.

DON’T RUIN ANY MORE OUR PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY DR. SINGH; QUIT.

Subhas Chandra Pattanayak

Dear Prime Minister Dr. Singh, please quit. The way you are busy in collecting support to sustain the confidence motion has already ruined peoples’ confidence in you.

Media, both print and electronic, have hit Indians hard with reports of how MPs are being considered as price-tagged commodities whose cost vary from one to hundred crores of rupees in transaction of the vote of confidence that you need so badly to stay in power.

TV channels have wrecked havoc on our collective sense of democratic decency by focusing even on the dishes you offered in dinner to MPs who support you.

Obnoxious.
Absolutely obnoxious.

If you perchance win the vote of confidence, you will continue to be devoid of the confidence of the peoples of India who hereafter will never believe that you won the number game in the House by virtue of probity and principled support.

Along with you, every Member of Parliament, who notwithstanding not belonging to UPA would support you, will also be looked at askance by the people, even though they might not be carrying any visible price tag and even though in reality they might have been above horse-trading.

You have dragged our democracy to such a devastative mess! This displayed portion of American “INSIDE BRIEFFING” clearly shows that advancing in the nuke deal matter was dependant on the prerequisite that “Indian Parliament must agree to the text” of the Hyde Act and the123 Agreement generated by this Act.

You kept this prerequisite hidden from the Parliament and the peoples of India. You should have accepted the prerequisite and placed the “text” of the Hyde Act and of the 123 Agreement before the Parliament and asked the members to “agree (or disagree) to the text” thereof and acted accordingly. It could have shown you as a duty bound democrat; but you did not do it. Why? Only you and your cohorts know.

And, by not doing this democratic duty, you have dragged the country to such a crisis that political flesh has become a tradable commodity and the MPs have become objects to mock at.

Please don’t ruin parliamentary democracy any more and quit.

NUKE DEAL: WHAT THE MEDIA AND INTELLIGENTSIA HAVE FAILED TO SEE

Subhas Chandra Pattanayak

On release of the India-specific safeguards agreement that India Government had kept hidden, even refusing to place it before the UPA-Left panel, a marginal number of pro-imperialism intelligentsia of India and mainstream media have churned out comments criticizing mostly the critics to whom the nuke deal with USA in the form and style felt is not in consonance with Indian interest.

Academically these comments are noteworthy. Samples:

“Indo-US Nuclear Deal in Perspective” by B Raman;

“Parsing the India-specific safeguards agreement”: by Siddharth Varadarajan in The Hindu, 12 July 2008;

“Close reading the IAEA safeguards” by C Raja Mohan in The Indian Express on 11 July 2008, online;

“The Cat’s Out” – Times of India Editorial, 11 July 2008;

“IAEA safeguards agreement takes care of India’s strategic interests” by Amitabh Sinha in The Indian Express, 12 July, 2008

“Interests safeguarded: Nuclear sovereignty not compromised” The Tribune editorial, 12 July, 2008 etc.

People like Brajesh Mishra and M R Iyer also have come out in praise of the IAEA agreement.

Against this backdrop, we have published the draft agreement for anybody to go through its text.

But what we miss in the comments referred to above and in similar write-ups is that the real culprit that has precipitated the political predicament in India over the nuke deal is conspicuous by its absence in them.

That culprit is ‘lack of concern for democracy’.

It was prerequisite for proceeding with the deal that “Indian Parliament must agree to the text” of the Hyde Act, as this is the Act under which the 123 Agreement is generated and this is the Act by which the nuke-deal will be controlled.

Therefore Prime Minister Singh should have placed the Hyde Act before the Indian Parliament for the Parliament to agree to the text of this Act. If the Parliament of India would not have agreed to its text, he should have stopped proceeding with the deal. But, he surprised the country by declaring in August 11, 2007 all on a sudden that the deal with USA “is sealed, signed and non negotiable”! Since then the country has been pushed into the bitterest turmoil. It is now everybody’s knowledge that he is busy in horse-trading.

He has not only reduced relevance of Parliament by not placing the “text” of Hyde Act for the members to agree or disagree, but also has blackened its image by sticking to power in order to facilitate horse-trading to continue in power!

Why he and Sonia Gandhi are so very mad to help USA clinch the deal? And, that too, to the total disadvantage of India?

I am afraid; people of this country will never again take Singh into confidence. But such an unfortunate decadence in his credibility would not have occurred had he placed the “text” of the Hyde Act before the Indian Parliament and left it for the Members to “agree (or disagree) to the text” thereof.

His motive in not taking this correct and prerequisite step is clandestine; but his advocacy that the Hyde Act has no relevance to the nuke deal being on records, generates biting suspicions against him.

“Washington would not support India’s case if it was contrary to the Hyde Act”. This is the version of US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice. So, this Hyde Act kept hidden from Indian Parliament, even though it is meant to control the operation of the deal, by Prime Minister Singh and UPA chief Sonia Gandhi is a serious offence against the country.

Moreover, on April 23, 2008, external affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee was on records to have said, “Parliament has the real authority to say yes or no to a treaty”. Sure, he knew what he meant by the words “yes or no”. He had used these words, as he knew that the deal’s prerequisite term was “Indian Parliament must agree to the text” of the deal.

Surprisingly, instead of asking the Parliament to say “yes” or “no” to the nuke deal, Singh’s government either used or misled the Speaker to limit the role of Parliament to help the government in assessing not the “yes” or “no” of members to the deal, but only to “take” “sense” of the House!

But in spite of such serious offence against the country, Singh and Sonia feel no qualms in boasting of cultivated support from persons like Mulayam Singh Yadav. This man whom voters of UP have thrashed down to dust for his anti-people activities, has declared that he would support Singh and Sonia because the nuke deal is essentially beneficial to the country. But this was the man who on September 30, 2007 had declared that he and his party would support any no-trust motion against UPA government if they do not discard the nuke deal, as the deal would be most catastrophic for the country! Why Mulayam has changed his color so swiftly?

Media and intelligentsia should also have tried to see the reason. But they have failed to see.

TO WHAT EXTENT ONE CAN BE SHAMELESS? LOOK AT THE CONGRESS AND ASSESS

Subhas Chandra Pattanayak

If you want to know as to what extent one can be shameless, look at the Congress and assess.

This party had taken lead to free India from foreign traders and to give democracy to Indians. But this party is now menacingly busy in destroying Indian democracy and to subjugate the country to another set of foreign traders.

Members of this party are not ashamed of this fall!

This party had given a Prime Minister to India in Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru who had founded and led the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) that had 118 countries of the world as its members comprising nearly two-third of the strength of United Nations and at least 55 percent of the world population united to ensure “the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of non-aligned countries” in their “struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, Zionism and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference or hegemony as well as against great power and bloc politics.” But this party has now a Prime Minister in Manmohan Singh whose single point program is to push India into hegemony of US of America and to obliterate all that its founder Prime Minister had stood for.

Members of this party are not ashamed of this fall!

This party had given India a Prime Minister in Lal Bahadur Sastri, who in his simple lifestyle had the most majestic leader the world could ever had and who in his small physical frame was as if the personification of the proud Himalayan Mountains. Peoples of India were seeing their collective identity in this leader, who had foiled Pakistan’s 1965 Operation Gibraltar. In the words of the US Department of State, through this adventure, “the Pakistani army (had) attempted to take Kashmir by force”. Sastri had gagged this gigantomachy by a prompt, proper and patriotic counterattack that saw every farmer of India woke up to his immortal words “Jai Jawan, Jai Kissan” emerged as a soldier in defense of the motherland. But the real villain that India vanquished in this war was the US of America whose “relations” with Pakistan “had been more consistently positive”. Its nexus with Pakistan was so nefarious that notwithstanding knowing that Pakistan “had joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and the Baghdad Pact (later renamed the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO) in 1955 to develop its military and defensive capabilities, which were substantially weaker than those of India” it felt no qualms in saying in a US Department of State document that it had “supplied arms to Pakistan in these years”. But now this party has a Prime Minister in Manmohan Singh who has been lobbying for USA to the detriment of Indian democracy and sovereignty.

Members of this party are not ashamed of this fall!

This party had given India a Prime Minister in Mrs. Indira Gandhi, who had avenged USA offences against India by standing strongly with USSR while contributing her might to further strengthening of the Non-Aligned Movement, thereby making USA isolated in world arena and shrunk into its own filthy cocoon. She had fought and won the war against Pakistan in 1971. She had made Pakistan surrender on 16th December 1971 at the summit of her success in bifurcating that country, which, pampered by USA had always been conspiring against India. She had defeated USA evil design and had stunned President Nixon and his cohort Kissinger so much by her diplomatic excellence that they had no other way than keeping on leash the ill-famed 7th fleet, which they had pressed into the sea on India’s eastern coast to assist Pakistan in its war against India. Mrs. Gandhi had elevated India’s sovereign mana by the magic she materialized in the nuclear explosion at Pokhran in 1974, which, in words of the then famous Secretary of State Henry Kissinger of USA, “was a bomb no matter how India described it”. After meeting Mrs. Gandhi and assessing the reality, he had told President Gerald Ford in 1974 that for Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Indo-US relations could improve only on a “more equal” basis and nothing less. Congress had given India such a Prime Minister. But now this party has a Prime Minister in Manmohan Singh, who crawls to serve the interests of US imperialism to the total detriment of India’s sovereign mana, so much so that in order to ensure that nuclear traders of USA get a great “bonanza” by selling their rotten nuclear reactors and hazardous nuclear waste to India, he is busy in capturing Indian MPs of uncategorized political isms through horse-trading to satisfy US President Bush in clamping on India the venomous nuke-deal formulated in USA in interest of USA!

Members of this party are not ashamed of this fall!

This party had given India a Prime Minister in Rajiv Gandhi who, in spite of having lost power and in spite of being under western influence, had the guts to pull down Chandrasekhar government in stark disapproval of refueling USA Warplanes during the Golf war in 1990. But now this party has a Prime Minister in Manmohan Singh who is disregarding Indian democracy to serve the business interest of USA by pushing India into a nuke deal that is “so very clearly” designed to serve the interests of US firms in bagging a “bonanza” for the nuclear trade of America.

Members of this party are not ashamed of this fall!

Of course, after “killing” of Rajiv Gandhi, the mysterious machinations of this party have pronouncedly become pro-American.

P. V. Narasimha Rao, the Prime Minister it gave India after “killing” of Rajiv Gandhi, sabotaged Indian Constitution and rendered its Preamble inconsequential by signing GATT agreement behind back of Indian Parliament to please and satisfy US of America. And, to survive in power so as to pave the way for foreign traders to grab Indian market, he resorted to horse-trading where people like Sibu Soren, whose only commodity was their political flesh, had got caught against a cost exceeding crores of Rupees to keep his bed of power active. He destroyed India, the land of dreams of innumerable martyrs and freedom fighters, the land of Mahatma Gandhi and B.R. Ambedkar, the land that every working Indian was holding to be his or her mother; and, in its place, with the help of a pack of scoundrels, he laid the foundation of the empire of exploiters under the mischief of free economy as advanced by the US of America. By wrong application of a judicial observation of the Supreme Court at a stage of a case that the CBI had from the beginning created sans the real thrust, Rao of course had escaped three years rigorous imprisonment; but he was held by Special CBI Judge Mr. Ajit Bharihoke guilty of “conspiracy” and “abatement” in making Sibu Soren & Co his political bed-partners. Despite set free, he shall remain forever a black spot on Indian democracy and people will always remember that he was sentenced to three years’ RI and a fine of Rs. 100,000 being convicted for having committed offences under Section 120b of the Indian Penal Code (criminal conspiracy) read with Sections 7, 12, 13(2) and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act as well as substantive offences under Section 12 for abetment to the crime of bribery. Rao had committed this offence against the country in order only to remain in power so that USA interests could be best served by imperialism replacing socialism as thrust of India. The Constitution of India in its Preamble was giving the direction for building up the country as a Socialist Republic. For imperialism this was the invincible hurdle. There was no scope to change the Preamble, because the Constitution of India has made it clear that any Article thereof may be amended except the Preamble. Rao and his cohorts, who were more eager to serve the interests of USA, had resorted to tricks of subterfuge and had succeeded in rendering the Preamble inconsequential by steering the country to its opposite direction, i.e. “free economy” in terms of imperialism. And, to do this, his government, lacking majority in Lok Sabha, was not competent. He had, therefore, indulged in horse-trading that eventually had gathered a nomenclature as JMM Bribery. This treachery of Rao had embarrassed the Congress party so much that the party had officially tried to distance itself from Rao. The then official spokesman of Congress, Ajit Jogi, in a statement following the judgment had put forth the party version in these words: “In response to the judgment handed down by the special court against Shri P V Narasimha Rao, at the outset the Congress party would like to reaffirm our esteem for the independence of the Indian judiciary. As a political party we are committed to the rule of law. Therefore we are duty-bound to respect the verdict of the court. Doubtless Shri P V Narasimha Rao has the right to appeal. Doubtless he will invoke that right. The judicial process will continue and the law will take its course.” So, officially, at least on records, Congress had distanced itself from Rao who had thrived in power by bribing Sibu Soren and his members of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha. But now again this party has a Prime Minister in Manmohan Singh, who with his background of being the principal architect of subterfuge against Indian Constitution as finance minister of Rao, is busy in same sort of horse-trading again with the same Sibu Soren & Co to continue in power so that USA would gain the pleasure of bagging the “bonanza” for her nuclear traders!

Congressmen are shamelessly silent!

INDO-US NUKE DEAL: IS IT THE DOCUMENT INDIA IS TO SIGN ON DOTTED LINES?

Subhas Chandra Pattanayak

The government on Wednesday ( June 18, 2008 ) ruled out giving to the Left the draft of the India-specific Internatonal Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement in connection with the Indo-US nuclear deal, but asserted that all their queries on this subject have been “answered.”
The above is the report of PTI on June 19, 2008 quoting Union Science Minister Kapil Sibal as told to TV channels, “It is not possible to give them (Left) the (safeguards) text.”

Before they sign it at Vienna, I hereby publish the hidden draft of the agreement available to me from sources in USA for perusal of people in India.

It is sad that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has kept the text of agreement secret from our people. When this draft is available to peoples in USA why Singh refused to share it with the left on whose mercy he was the Prime Minister till then?

One of the cardinal conditions for the deal to proceed was, as earlier exposed, “The Indian Parliament must agree to the text” of Hyde Act / 123 Agreement. The text of the Hyde Act /123 Agreement has never been agreed to by Indian Parliament. Governments of both the countries, India and USA, know it absolutely clearly. How then the safeguard agreement at Vienna can be valid?

Why the Manmohan Singh government is cheating the people of India?

Rushing with the deal when legitimacy of his continuance in office is severely affected after loosing majority in the House, he has shown how waylessly he has succumbed to USA pressure. But on reading of the draft safeguards agreement one wonders, is India going to sign on dotted lines at Vienna?

Here below is the draft:

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO CIVILIAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES

RECOGNIZING the significance India attaches to civilian nuclear energy as an efficient, clean and sustainable energy source for meeting global energy demand, in particular for meeting India’s growing energy needs;
WHEREAS India is committed to the full development of its national three-stage nuclear programme to meet the twin challenges of energy security and protection of the environment;
WHEREAS India has a sovereign and inalienable right to carry out nuclear research and development activities for the welfare of its people and other peaceful purposes;
WHEREAS India, a State with advanced nuclear technology, wishes to expand civil nuclear cooperation for its national development;
WHEREAS India is desirous of further expanding cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as “the Agency”) and its Member States with the objective of the full development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, on a stable, reliable and predictable basis;
WHEREAS India supports the role of the Agency in the promotion of the safe and peaceful uses of nuclear energy as set forth in the Statute of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as the “Statute”);
WHEREAS India and the Agency have long standing cooperation in various aspects of the Agency’s activities;
RECOGNIZING that such cooperation between India and the Agency must be carried out with full respect for the objectives of the Statute and with due observance of the sovereign rights of India;
WHEREAS the Statute authorizes the Agency to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State to any of the State’s activities in the field of atomic energy and, in this context:
Noting the relevance for this Agreement of the understandings between India and the United States of America expressed in the India-U.S. Joint Statement of 18 July 2005, in which India, inter alia, has stated its willingness:
* to identify and separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes in a phased manner;
* to file with the Agency a declaration regarding its civilian nuclear facilities (hereinafter referred to as “the Declaration”);
* to take a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards;
Noting also for the purposes of this Agreement that:
* India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards so as to facilitate full civil nuclear cooperation between India and Member States of the Agency and to provide assurance against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time;
* An essential basis of India’s concurrence to accept Agency safeguards under an India-specific safeguards agreement (hereinafter referred to as “this Agreement”) is the conclusion of international cooperation arrangements creating the necessary conditions for India to obtain access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continuous access to fuel supplies from companies in several nations, as well as support for an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors; and
*India may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies;
WHEREAS India is desirous of expanding civil nuclear cooperation with other Member States of the Agency;
WHEREAS the conclusion of this Agreement is intended to facilitate the broadest possible cooperation between India and Member States of the Agency in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and ensure international participation in the further development of India’s civilian nuclear programme on a sustained and long-term basis;
RECALLING that the Agency in accordance with its Statute and safeguards system must take into account, in the implementation of safeguards in India, the need to avoid hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, economic and technological development or international cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; respect health, safety and physical protection and related security provisions in force in India; and take every precaution to protect commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge;
WHEREAS the frequency and intensity of activities described in this Agreement shall be kept to the minimum consistent with the objective of effective and efficient Agency safeguards;
WHEREAS India has requested the Agency to apply safeguards with respect to items subject to this Agreement;
WHEREAS the Board of Governors of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as the “Board”) acceded to that request on …………;
NOW THEREFORE, taking into account the above, India and the Agency have agreed as follows:
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS
1. India undertakes that none of the items subject to this Agreement, as defined in paragraph 11, shall be used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any other military purpose and that such items shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not be used for the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.
2. The Agency undertakes to apply safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, to the items subject to this Agreement, as defined in paragraph 11, so as to ensure, as far as it is able, that no such item is used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any other military purpose and that such items are used exclusively for peaceful purposes and not for the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.
B. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
3. The purpose of safeguards under this Agreement is to guard against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time.
4. The application of safeguards under this Agreement is intended to facilitate implementation of relevant bilateral or multilateral arrangements to which India is a party, which are essential to the accomplishment of the objective of this Agreement.
5. Bearing in mind Article II of the Statute, the Agency shall implement safeguards in a manner designed to avoid hampering India’s economic or technological development, and not to hinder or otherwise interfere with any activities involving the use by India of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology produced, acquired or developed by India independent of this Agreement for its own purposes.
6. The safeguards procedures set forth in this document shall be implemented in a manner designed to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities.
7. In implementing safeguards, the Agency shall take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial secrets. No member of the Agency’s staff shall disclose, except to the Director General and to such other members of the staff as the Director General may authorize to have such information by reason of their official duties in connection with safeguards, any commercial or industrial secret or any other confidential information coming to his knowledge by reason of the implementation of safeguards by the Agency.
8. The Agency shall not publish or communicate to any State, organization or person any information obtained by it in connection with the implementation of safeguards in India, except that:
(a) Specific information relating to such implementation in India may be given to the Board and to such Agency staff members as require such knowledge by reason of their official duties in connection with safeguards, but only to the extent necessary for the Agency to fulfil its safeguards responsibilities;
(b) Summarized lists of items being safeguarded by the Agency may be published upon decision of the Board; and
(c) Additional information may be published upon decision of the Board and if all States directly concerned agree.
9. In the light of Article XII.A.5 of the Statute, safeguards shall continue with respect to produced special fissionable material and to any materials substituted therefor.
10. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect other rights and obligations of India under international law.
II. CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRING SAFEGUARDS
A. ITEMS SUBJECT TO THIS AGREEMENT
11. The items subject to this Agreement shall be:
(a) Any facility listed in the Annex to this Agreement, as notified by India pursuant to paragraph 14(a) of this Agreement;
(b) Any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components supplied to India which are required to be safeguarded pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement to which India is a party;
(c) Any nuclear material, including subsequent generations of special fissionable material, produced, processed or used in or by the use of a facility listed in the Annex or in or by the use of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components referred to in paragraph 11(b);
(d) Any nuclear material substituted in accordance with paragraph 27 or 30(d) of this Agreement for nuclear material referred to in paragraph 11(b) or 11(c) of this Agreement;
(e) Any heavy water substituted in accordance with paragraph 32 of this Agreement for heavy water subject to this Agreement;
(f) Any facility other than a facility identified in paragraph 11(a) above, or any other location in India, while producing, processing, using, fabricating or storing any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or components referred to in paragraph 11(b), (c), (d) or (e) of this Agreement, as notified by India pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of this Agreement.
12. The scope of this Agreement is limited to the items subject to this Agreement as defined in paragraph 11 above.
Declaration
13. Upon entry into force of this Agreement, and a determination by India that all conditions conducive to the accomplishment of the objective of this Agreement are in place, India shall file with the Agency a Declaration, based on its sovereign decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards in a phased manner.
Notifications
14.
(a) India, on the basis of its sole determination, shall notify the Agency in writing of its decision to offer for Agency safeguards a facility identified by India in the Declaration referred to in paragraph 13, or any other facility to be determined by India. Any facility so notified by India to the Agency will be included in the Annex, and become subject to this Agreement, as of the date of receipt by the Agency of such written notification from India.
(b) Should India, on the basis of its sole determination, decide to import or transfer any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or components subject to this Agreement to any facility or other location in India provided for in paragraph 11(f) of this Agreement, it shall so notify the Agency. Any such facility or location so notified by India pursuant to this sub-paragraph shall become subject to this Agreement as of the date of receipt by the Agency of such written notification from India.
15. India shall notify the Agency of the receipt of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components referred to in paragraph 11(b) of this Agreement within four weeks of the arrival in India of such nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components.
Provision of Information to the Agency
16. In the event that India’s notification pursuant to paragraph 14(a) of this Agreement relates to a facility subject to Agency safeguards under another Safeguards Agreement or Agreements in India at the time of entry into force of this Agreement, India shall provide the Agency, along with the relevant notification, such information as is required pursuant to the other Safeguards Agreement or Agreements as relates to any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components subject to safeguards thereunder.
17. With respect to any other facility listed in the Annex pursuant to paragraph 14(a) of this Agreement, India shall provide the Agency, within four weeks of the relevant notification, with:
(a) a list of all nuclear material at each such facility; and
(b) where relevant, and if required pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement to which India is party, information relating to:
(i) Any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components supplied to India for production , processing, storage or use in such facility;
(ii) Any nuclear material, including subsequent generations of special fissionable material, produced, processed or used in or by the use of such facility or in or by the use of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components supplied to India for production, processing or use in such facility.
18. Each notification pursuant to paragraph 15 of the Agreement shall include all information relevant to the nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components so notified, including the facility or location where the nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components so notified will be received.
19. The information provided by India pursuant to paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 of this Agreement shall specify, inter alia, to the extent relevant, the nuclear and chemical composition, physical form and quantity of the nuclear material; the date of shipment; the date of receipt; the identity of the consigner and the consignee; and any other relevant information, such as the type and capacity of any facility (or parts thereof), components or equipment; and the type and quantity of non-nuclear material. In the case of a facility or other location subject to this Agreement, the information to be provided shall include the type and capacity of that facility or location, and any other relevant information.
20. India shall thereafter notify the Agency by means of reports, in accordance with this Agreement, of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components referred to in paragraph 11(b), (c), (d) or (e) of this Agreement. The Agency may verify the calculations of the amounts and/or quantities of such nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components, and appropriate adjustments shall be made by agreement between India and the Agency.
21. The Agency shall maintain an inventory of items subject to this Agreement. The Agency shall send a copy of the inventory it maintains with respect to such information to India every twelve months and also at any other times specified by India in a request communicated to the Agency at least two weeks in advance.
B. SAFEGUARDS UNDER OTHER AGREEMENTS
22. The application of Agency safeguards under other Safeguards Agreements concluded by India with the Agency and in force at the time of entry into force of this Agreement may, subject to agreement by the Parties to such other Safeguards Agreements and following notification by India of the relevant facilities pursuant to paragraph 14(a), be suspended while this Agreement is in force. The application of safeguards under this Agreement to nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or components subject to safeguards under such other Agreements shall commence as of the date of receipt by the Agency of India’s notification. India’s undertaking not to use items subject thereto in such a way as to further any military purpose, and its undertaking that such items shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not be used for the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device, shall continue to apply.
C. EXEMPTIONS FROM SAFEGUARDS
General Exemptions
23. Nuclear material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards shall be exempted from safeguards at the request of India, provided that the material so exempted in India may not at any time exceed:
(a) 1 kilogram in total of special fissionable material, which may consist of one or more of the following:
(i) Plutonium;
(ii) Uranium with an enrichment of 0.2 (20 %) and above, taken account of by multiplying its weight by its enrichment;
(iii) Uranium with an enrichment below 0.2 (20 %) and above that of natural uranium, taken account of by multiplying its weight by five times the square of its enrichment;
(b) 10 metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an enrichment above 0.005 (0.5 %);
(c) 20 metric tons of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5 %) or below; and
(d) 20 metric tons of thorium.
Exemptions Related to Reactors
24. Produced or used nuclear material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards because it is being or has been produced, processed or used in a reactor which has been supplied wholly or substantially under a project agreement, submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement by the parties to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement or unilaterally submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement; or because it is being or has been produced in or by the use of safeguarded nuclear material, shall be exempted from safeguards if:
(a) It is plutonium produced in the fuel of a reactor whose rate of production does not exceed 100 grams of plutonium per year; or
(b) It is produced in a reactor determined by the Agency to have a maximum calculated power for continuous operation of less than 3 thermal megawatts, or is used in such a reactor and would not be subject to safeguards except for such use, provided that the total power of the reactors with respect to which these exemptions apply in any State may not exceed 6 thermal megawatts.
25. Produced special fissionable material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards only because it has been produced in or by the use of safeguarded nuclear material shall in part be exempted from safeguards if it is produced in a reactor in which the ratio of fissionable isotopes within safeguarded nuclear material to all fissionable isotopes is less than 0.3 (calculated each time any change is made in the loading of the reactor and assumed to be maintained until the next such change). Such fraction of the produced material as corresponds to the calculated ratio shall be subject to safeguards.
D. SUSPENSION OF SAFEGUARDS
26. Safeguards with respect to nuclear material may be suspended while the material is transferred, under an arrangement or agreement approved by the Agency, for the purpose of processing, reprocessing, testing, research or development, within India or to any other Member State or to an international organization, provided that the quantities of nuclear material with respect to which safeguards are thus suspended in India may not at any time exceed:
(a) 1 effective kilogram of special fissionable material;
(b) 10 metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an enrichment 0.005 (0.5 %);
(c) 20 metric tons of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5 %) or below; and
(d) 20 metric tons of thorium.
27. Safeguards with respect to nuclear material in irradiated fuel which is transferred for the purpose of reprocessing may also be suspended if the State or States concerned have, with the agreement of the Agency, placed under safeguards substitute nuclear material in accordance with paragraph 30(d) of this Agreement for the period of suspension. In addition, safeguards with respect to plutonium contained in irradiated fuel which is transferred for the purpose of reprocessing may be suspended for a period not to exceed six months if the State or States concerned have, with the agreement of the Agency, placed under safeguards a quantity of uranium whose enrichment in the isotope uranium-235 is not less than 0.9 (90%) and the uranium-235 content of which is equal in weight to such plutonium. Upon expiration of the said six months or the completion of reprocessing, whichever is earlier, safeguards shall, with the agreement of the Agency, be applied to such plutonium and shall cease to apply to the uranium substituted therefor.
28. Under conditions specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the Agency shall suspend safeguards with respect to any parts of the facilities listed in the Annex which are removed for maintenance or repair.
E. TERMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS
29. The termination of safeguards on items subject to this Agreement shall be implemented taking into account the provisions of GOV/1621 (20 August 1973).
30. Nuclear material shall no longer be subject to safeguards under this Agreement after:
(a) It has been returned to the State that originally supplied it (whether directly or through the Agency), if it was subject to safeguards only by reason of such supply and if:
(i) It was not improved while under safeguards; or
(ii) Any special fissionable material that was produced in it under safeguards has been separated out, or safeguards with respect to such produced material have been terminated ; or
(b) The Agency has determined that:
(i) It was subject to safeguards only by reason of its use in a principal nuclear facility which has been supplied wholly or substantially under a project agreement, submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement by the parties to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement or unilaterally submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement;
(ii) It has been removed from such a facility; and
(iii) Any special fissionable material that was produced in it under safeguards has been separated out, or safeguards with respect to such produced material have been terminated; or
(c) The Agency has determined that it has been consumed, or has been diluted in such a way that it is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or has become practicably irrecoverable; or
(d) India has, with the agreement of the Agency, placed under safeguards, as a substitute, such amount of the same element, not otherwise subject to safeguards, as the Agency has determined contains fissionable isotopes:
(i) Whose weight (with due allowance for processing losses) is equal to or greater than the weight of the fissionable isotopes of the material with respect to which safeguards are to terminate; and
(ii) Whose ratio by weight to the total substituted element is similar to or greater than the ratio by weight of the fissionable isotopes of the material with respect to which safeguards are to terminate to the total weight of such material;
provided that the Agency may agree to the substitution of plutonium for uranium-235 contained in uranium whose enrichment is not greater than 0.05 (5.0 %); or
(e) It has been transferred out of India under paragraph 33(d) of this Agreement, provided that such material shall again be subject to safeguards if it is returned to India; or
(f) The terms of this Agreement, pursuant to which it was subject to safeguards under this Agreement, no longer apply, by expiration of this Agreement or otherwise.
31. If India wishes to use safeguarded source material for non-nuclear purposes, such as the production of alloys or ceramics, it shall agree with the Agency on the circumstances under which the safeguards on such material may be terminated.
32. Safeguards shall be terminated on a facility listed in the Annex after India and the Agency have jointly determined that the facility is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards. Safeguards on non-nuclear material, equipment and components subject to this Agreement may be terminated as and when the non-nuclear material, equipment or components have been returned to the supplier or arrangements have been made by the Agency to safeguard the non-nuclear material, equipment or components in the State to which it is being transferred, or when India and the Agency have jointly determined that the non-nuclear material, equipment or component in question has been consumed, is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards or has become practicably irrecoverable. Safeguards may be terminated on heavy water upon India’s placing under safeguards as substitute the same amount of heavy water of equivalent or better heavy water concentration.
F. TRANSFERS
33. No safeguarded nuclear material shall be transferred outside the jurisdiction of India until the Agency has satisfied itself that one or more of the following conditions apply:
(a) The material is being returned, under the conditions specified in paragraph 30(a) of this Agreement, to the State that originally supplied it; or
(b) The material is being transferred subject to the provisions of paragraph 26 or 27 of this Agreement; or
(c) Arrangements have been made by the Agency to safeguard the material in the State to which it is being transferred; or
(d) The material was not subject to safeguards pursuant to a project agreement and will be subject, in the State to which it is being transferred, to safeguards other than those of the Agency but generally consistent with such safeguards and accepted by the Agency.
34. India shall notify the Agency of its intention to transfer within its jurisdiction any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or component subject to this Agreement to any facility or location in India to which paragraph 11(f) applies and shall provide to the Agency, before such transfer is effected, the necessary information to enable the Agency to make arrangements for the application of safeguards to such nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or component after its transfer. The Agency shall also be given the opportunity as early as possible in advance of such a transfer to review the design of the facility for the sole purpose of determining that the arrangements provided for in this Agreement can be effectively applied. India may transfer the nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or component only after the Agency has confirmed that it has made such arrangements.
35. India shall notify the Agency of its intention to transfer any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or component subject to this Agreement to a recipient which is not under the jurisdiction of India. Except as provided for in paragraph 30(a) of this Agreement, such nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or component shall be so transferred only after the Agency has informed India that it has satisfied itself that Agency safeguards will apply with respect to the nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or component in the recipient country. Upon receipt by the Agency of the notification of transfer from India and the confirmation of receipt by the recipient country, safeguards on such nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or component shall be terminated under this Agreement.
36. The notifications referred to in paragraphs 34 and 35 of this Agreement shall be made to the Agency sufficiently in advance to enable it to make the arrangements required before the transfer is effected. The Agency shall promptly take any necessary action. The time limits for and the contents of these notifications shall be set out in the Subsidiary Arrangements.
III. SAFEGUARDS PROCEDURES
A. GENERAL PROCEDURES
Introduction
37. The safeguards procedures to be applied by the Agency are those specified in this Agreement, as well as such additional procedures as result from technological developments, and other procedures as may be agreed to between the Agency and India. The safeguards procedures set forth below shall be followed, as far as relevant, with respect to any item subject to this Agreement.
38. The Agency shall conclude with India Subsidiary Arrangements concerning the implementation of the safeguards procedures referred to above. The Subsidiary Arrangements shall also include any necessary arrangements for the application of safeguards to any item subject to this Agreement, including such containment and surveillance measures as are required for the effective implementation of safeguards. The Subsidiary Arrangements shall enter into force no later than six months after entry into force of this Agreement.
Design Review
39. The Agency shall review the design of principal nuclear facilities, for the sole purpose of satisfying itself that a facility will permit the effective application of safeguards.
40. The design review of a principal nuclear facility shall take place at as early a stage as possible. In particular, such review shall be carried out in the case of:
(a) An Agency project, before the project is approved;
(b) A bilateral or multilateral arrangement under which the responsibility for administering safeguards is to be transferred to the Agency, or an activity or facility unilaterally submitted by India, before the Agency assumes safeguards responsibilities with respect to the facility;
(c) A transfer of safeguarded nuclear material to a principal nuclear facility whose design has not previously been reviewed, before such transfer takes place; and
(d) A significant modification of a principal nuclear facility whose design has previously been reviewed, before such modification is undertaken.
41. To enable the Agency to perform the required design review, India shall submit to it relevant design information sufficient for the purpose, including information on such basic characteristics of the principal nuclear facility as may bear on the Agency’s safeguards procedures. The Agency shall require only the minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its responsibility under this section. It shall complete the review promptly after the submission of this information by India and shall notify the latter of its conclusions without delay.
42. If the Agency wishes to examine design information which India regards as sensitive, the Agency shall, if India so requests, conduct the examination on premises in India. Such information should not be physically transmitted to the Agency provided that it remains readily available for examination by the Agency in India.
Records
43. India shall arrange for the keeping of records with respect to principal nuclear facilities and also with respect to all safeguarded nuclear material outside such facilities. For this purpose India and the Agency shall agree on a system of records with respect to each facility and also with respect to such material, on the basis of proposals to be submitted by India in sufficient time to allow the Agency to review them before the records need to be kept.
44. All records shall be kept in English.
45. The records shall consist, as appropriate, of:
(a) Accounting records of all safeguarded nuclear material; and
(b) Operating records for principal nuclear facilities.
46. All records shall be retained for at least two years.
Reports
General Requirements
47. India shall submit to the Agency reports with respect to the production, processing and use of safeguarded nuclear material in or outside principal nuclear facilities. For this purpose, India and the Agency shall agree on a system of reports with respect to each facility and also with respect to safeguarded nuclear material outside such facilities, on the basis of proposals to be submitted by India in sufficient time to allow the Agency to review them before the reports need to be submitted. The reports need include only such information as is relevant for the purpose of safeguards.
48. All reports shall be submitted in English.
Routine Reports
49. Routine reports shall be based on the records compiled in accordance with paragraphs 43 to 46 of this Agreement and shall consist, as appropriate, of:
(a) Accounting reports showing the receipt, transfer out, inventory and use of all safeguarded nuclear material. The inventory shall indicate the nuclear and chemical composition and physical form of all material and its location on the date of the report; and
(b) Operating reports showing the use that has been made of each principal nuclear facility since the last report and, as far as possible, the programme of future work in the period until the next routine report is expected to reach the Agency.
50. The first routine report shall be submitted as soon as:
(a) There is any safeguarded nuclear material to be accounted for; or
(b) The principal nuclear facility to which it relates is in a condition to operate.
Progress in Construction
51. The Agency may request information as to when particular stages in the construction of a principal nuclear facility have been or are to be reached.
Special Reports
52. India shall report to the Agency without delay:
(a) If any unusual incident occurs involving actual or potential loss or destruction of, or damage to, any safeguarded nuclear material or principal nuclear facility;
(b) If there is good reason to believe that safeguarded nuclear material is lost or unaccounted for in quantities that exceed the normal operating and handling losses that have been accepted by the Agency as characteristic of the facility; or
(c) Disruption of operation of facilities listed in the Annex on account of material violation or breach of bilateral or multilateral arrangements to which India is a party.
53. India shall report to the Agency, as soon as possible, and in any case within two weeks, any transfer not requiring advance notification that will result in a significant change (to be defined by the Agency in agreement with India) in the quantity of safeguarded nuclear material in a principal nuclear facility. Such report shall indicate the amount and nature of the material and its intended use.
Amplification of Reports
54. At the Agency’s request, India shall submit amplifications or clarifications of any report, in so far as relevant for the purpose of safeguards.
Inspections
General Procedures
55. The Agency may inspect any items subject to this Agreement.
56. The purpose of safeguards inspections under this Agreement shall be to verify compliance by India with this Agreement and to assist India in complying with this Agreement and in resolving any questions arising out of the implementation of safeguards.
57. The number, duration and intensity of inspections actually carried out shall be kept to the minimum consistent with the effective implementation of safeguards, and if the Agency considers that the authorized inspections are not all required, fewer shall be carried out.
58. Inspectors shall neither operate any facility themselves nor direct the staff of a facility to carry out any particular operation.
Routine Inspections
59. Routine inspections may include, as appropriate:
(a) Audit of records and reports;
(b) Verification of the amount of safeguarded nuclear material by physical inspection, measurement and sampling;
(c) Examination of principal nuclear facilities, including a check of their measuring instruments and operating characteristics; and
(d) Check of the operations carried out at principal nuclear facilities.
60. Whenever the Agency has the right of access to a principal nuclear facility at all times, it may perform inspections of which notice as required by paragraph 4 of the Inspectors Document need not be given, in so far as this is necessary for the effective application of safeguards. The actual procedures to implement these provisions shall be agreed upon between India and the Agency.
Initial Inspections of a Principal Nuclear Facility
61. To verify that the construction of a principal nuclear facility is in accordance with the design reviewed by the Agency, an initial inspection or inspections of the facility may be carried out:
(a) As soon as possible after the facility has come under Agency safeguards, in the case of a facility already in operation; and
(b) Before the facility starts to operate, in other cases.
62. The measuring instruments and operating characteristics of the facility shall be reviewed to the extent necessary for the purpose of implementing safeguards. Instruments that will be used to obtain data on the nuclear materials in the facility may be tested to determine their satisfactory functioning. Such testing may include the observation by inspectors of commissioning or routine tests by the staff of the facility, but shall not hamper or delay the construction, commissioning or normal operation of the facility.
Special Inspections
63. The Agency may carry out special inspections if:
(a) The study of a report indicates that such inspection is desirable; or
(b) Any unforeseen circumstance requires immediate action.
The Board shall subsequently be informed of the reasons for and the results of each such inspection.
64. The Agency may also carry out special inspections of substantial amounts of safeguarded nuclear material that are to be transferred outside the jurisdiction of India, for which purpose India shall give the Agency sufficient advance notice of any such proposed transfer.
B. SPECIAL PROCEDURES FOR REACTORS
Reports
65. The frequency of submission of routine reports shall be agreed between the Agency and India, taking into account the frequency established for routine inspections. However, at least two such reports shall be submitted each year and in no case shall more than 12 such reports be required in any year.
Inspections
66. One of the initial inspections of a reactor shall if possible be made just before the reactor first reaches criticality.
67. The maximum frequency of routine inspections of a reactor and of the safeguarded nuclear material in it shall be determined from the following table:
Whichever is the largest of: (a) Facility inventory (including loading); (b) Annual throughput; (c) Maximum potential annual production of special fissionable material (Effective kilograms of nuclear material) Maximum number of routine inspections annually
Up to 1 More than 1 and up to 5 More than 5 and up to 10 More than 10 and up to 15 More than 15 and up to 20 More than 20 and up to 25 More than 25 and up to 30 More than 30 and up to 35 More than 35 and up to 40 More than 40 and up to 45 More than 45 and up to 50 More than 50 and up to 55 More than 55 and up to 60 More than 60 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Right of access at all times

68. The actual frequency of inspection of a reactor shall take account of:
(a) The fact that India possesses irradiated fuel reprocessing facilities:
(b) The nature of the reactor; and
(c) The nature and amount of the nuclear material produced or used in the reactor.
C. SPECIAL PROCEDURES RELATING TO SAFEGUARDED NUCLEAR MATERIAL OUTSIDE PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR FACILITIES
Nuclear Material in Research and Development Facilities
Routine Reports
69. Only accounting reports need be submitted in respect of nuclear material in research and development facilities. The frequency of submission of such routine reports shall be agreed between the Agency and India, taking into account the frequency established for routine inspections; however, at least one such report shall be submitted each year and in no case shall more than 12 such reports be required in any year.
Routine Inspections
70. The maximum frequency of routine inspections of safeguarded nuclear material in a research and development facility shall be that specified in the table in paragraph 67 of this Agreement for the total amount of material in the facility.
Source Material in Sealed Storage
71. The following simplified procedures for safeguarding stockpiled source material shall be applied if India undertakes to store such material in a sealed storage facility and not to remove it therefrom without previously informing the Agency.
Design of Storage Facilities
72. India shall submit to the Agency information on the design of each sealed storage facility and agree with the Agency on the method and procedure for sealing it.
Routine Reports
73. Two routine accounting reports in respect of source material in sealed storage shall be submitted each year.
Routine Inspections
74. The Agency may perform one routine inspection of each sealed storage facility annually.
Removal of Material
75. India may remove safeguarded source material from a sealed storage facility after informing the Agency of the amount, type and intended use of the material to be removed, and providing sufficient other data in time to enable the Agency to continue safeguarding the material after it has been removed.
Nuclear Material in Other Locations
76. Except to the extent that safeguarded nuclear material outside of principal nuclear facilities is covered by any of the provisions set forth in paragraphs 69 to 75 of this Agreement, the following procedures shall be applied with respect to such material (for example, source material stored elsewhere than in a sealed storage facility, or special fissionable material used in a sealed neutron source in the field).
Routine Reports
77. Routine accounting reports in respect of all safeguarded nuclear material in this category shall be submitted periodically. The frequency of submission of such reports shall be agreed between the Agency and India, taking into account the frequency established for routine inspections; however, at least one such report shall be submitted each year and in no case shall more than 12 such reports be required in any year.
Routine Inspections
78. The maximum frequency of routine inspections of safeguarded nuclear material in this category shall be one inspection annually if the total amount of such material does not exceed five effective kilograms, and shall be determined from the table in paragraph 67 of this Agreement if the amount is greater.
D. PROVISIONS FOR REPROCESSING PLANTS
Introduction
79. Additional procedures applicable to the safeguarding of reprocessing plants are set out below.
Special Procedures
Reports
80. The frequency of submission of routine reports shall be once each calendar month.
Inspections
81. A reprocessing plant having an annual throughput not exceeding 5 effective kilograms of nuclear material, and the safeguarded nuclear material in it, may be routinely inspected twice a year. The reprocessing plant, having an annual throughput exceeding 5 effective kilograms of nuclear material, and the safeguarded nuclear material in it, may be inspected at all times. The arrangements for inspections set forth in paragraph 60 of this Agreement shall apply to all inspections to be made under this paragraph. It is understood that for plants having an annual throughput of more than 60 effective kilograms, the right of access at all times would be normally be implemented by means of continuous inspection.
82. When a reprocessing plant is under Agency safeguards only because it contains safeguarded nuclear material, the inspection frequency shall be based on the rate of delivery of safeguarded nuclear material.
83. India and the Agency shall cooperate in making all the necessary arrangements to facilitate the taking, shipping or analysis of samples, due account being taken of the limitations imposed by the characteristics of a plant already in operation when placed under Agency safeguards.
Mixtures of Safeguarded and Unsafeguarded Nuclear Material
84. India and the Agency may agree on the following special arrangements in the case of a reprocessing plant which has not been supplied wholly or substantially under a project agreement, submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement by the parties to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement or unilaterally submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement, and in which safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear materials are present:
(a) Subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) below, the Agency shall restrict its safeguards procedures to the area in which irradiated fuel is stored, until such time as all or any part of such fuel is transferred out of the storage area into other parts of the plant. Safeguards procedures shall cease to apply to the storage area or plant when either contains no safeguarded nuclear material; and
(b) Where possible, safeguarded nuclear material shall be measured and sampled separately from unsafeguarded material, and at as early a stage as possible. Where separate measurement, sampling or processing are not possible, the whole of the material being processed in that campaign shall be subject to the safeguards procedures set out in Part III.D of this Agreement. At the conclusion of the processing the nuclear material that is thereafter to be safeguarded shall be selected by agreement between India and the Agency from the whole output of the plant resulting from that campaign, due account being taken of any processing losses accepted by the Agency.
E. PROVISIONS FOR CONVERSION PLANTS, ENRICHMENT PLANTS AND FABRICATION PLANTS
Introduction
85. Additional procedures applicable to conversion plants and fabrication plants are set out below. This terminology is synonymous with the term “a plant for processing or fabricating nuclear material (excepting a mine or ore-processing plant)” which is used in paragraph 117 of this Agreement.
86. In the event that India decides to offer an enrichment plant in the future as a facility subject to this Agreement, the Agency and India shall consult and agree on the application of the Agency’s safeguards procedures for enrichment plants before any such facility is added to the Annex.
Special Procedures
Reports
87. The frequency of submission of routine reports shall be once each calendar month.
Inspections
88. A conversion plant or a fabrication plant which has been supplied wholly or substantially under a project agreement, submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement by the parties to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or unilaterally submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement, and the nuclear material in it, may be inspected at all times if the plant inventory at any time, or the annual input, of nuclear material exceeds five effective kilograms. Where neither the inventory at any time, nor the annual input, exceeds five effective kilograms of nuclear material, the routine inspections shall not exceed two a year. The arrangements for inspections set forth in paragraph 57 of this Agreement shall apply to all inspections to be made under this paragraph. It is understood that, for plants having an inventory at any time, or an annual input, of more than 60 effective kilograms, the right of access at all times would normally be implemented by means of continuous inspection. Where neither the inventory at any time nor the annual input exceeds one effective kilogram of nuclear material, the plant would not normally be subject to routine inspection.
89. When a conversion plant or a fabrication plant which has not been supplied wholly or substantially under a project agreement, submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement by the parties to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement or unilaterally submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement contains safeguarded nuclear material, the frequency of routine inspections shall be based on the inventory at any time and the annual input of safeguarded nuclear material. Where the inventory at any time, or the annual input, of safeguarded nuclear material exceeds five effective kilograms the plant may be inspected at all times. Where neither the inventory at any time, nor the annual input, exceeds five effective kilograms of safeguarded nuclear material, the routine inspections shall not exceed two a year. The arrangements for inspection set forth in paragraph 60 shall apply to all inspections to be made under this paragraph. It is understood that, for plants having an inventory at any time, or an annual input, of more than 60 effective kilograms, the right of access at all times would normally be implemented by means of continuous inspection. Where neither the inventory at any time nor the annual input exceeds one effective kilogram of nuclear material, the plant would not normally be subject to routine inspection.
90. The intensity of inspection of safeguarded nuclear material at various steps in a conversion plant or a fabrication plant shall take account of the nature, isotopic composition and amount of safeguarded nuclear material in the plant. Safeguards shall be applied in accordance with the general principles set forth in paragraphs 4 to 8 of this Agreement. Emphasis shall be placed on inspection to control uranium of high enrichments and plutonium.
91. Where a plant may handle safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear material, India shall notify the Agency in advance of the programme for handling safeguarded batches to enable the Agency to make inspections during these periods, due account being also taken of the arrangements under paragraph 92 of this Agreement.
92. India and the Agency shall cooperate in making all the necessary arrangements to facilitate the preparation of inventories of safeguarded nuclear material and the taking, shipping and/or analysis of samples, due account being taken of the limitations imposed by the characteristics of a plant already in operation when placed under Agency safeguards.
Residues, Scrap and Waste
93. India shall ensure that safeguarded nuclear material contained in residues, scrap or waste created during conversion or fabrication is recovered, as far as is practicable, in its facilities and within a reasonable period of time. If such recovery is not considered practicable by India, India and the Agency shall cooperate in making arrangements to account for and dispose of the material.
Safeguarded and Unsafeguarded Nuclear Material
94. India and the Agency may agree on the following special arrangements in the case of a conversion plant or a fabrication plant which has not been supplied wholly or substantially under a project agreement, submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement by the parties to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement or unilaterally submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement, and in which safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear material are both present:
(a) Subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) below, the Agency shall restrict its safeguards procedures to the area in which safeguarded nuclear material is stored, until such time as all or any part of such nuclear material is transferred out of the storage area into other parts of the plant. Safeguards procedures shall cease to be applied to the storage area or plant when it contains no safeguarded nuclear material; and
(b) Where possible, safeguarded nuclear material shall be measured and sampled separately from unsafeguarded nuclear material, and at as early a stage as possible. Where separate measurement, sampling or processing is not possible, any nuclear material containing safeguarded nuclear material shall be subject to the safeguards procedures set out in Part III.E of this Agreement. At the conclusion of processing, the nuclear material that is thereafter to be safeguarded shall be selected, in accordance with paragraph 96 of this Agreement when applicable, by agreement between India and the Agency, due account being taken of any processing losses accepted by the Agency.
Blending of Nuclear Material
95. When safeguarded nuclear material is to be blended with either safeguarded or unsafeguarded nuclear material, the State shall notify the Agency sufficiently in advance of the programme of blending to enable the Agency to exercise its right to obtain evidence, through inspection of the blending operation or otherwise, that the blending is performed according to the programme.
96. When safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear material are blended, if the ratio of fissionable isotopes in the safeguarded component going into the blend to all the fissionable isotopes in the blend is 0.3 or greater, and if the concentration of fissionable isotopes in the unsafeguarded nuclear material is increased by such blending, then the whole blend shall remain subject to safeguards. In other cases, the following procedures shall apply:
(a) Plutonium/plutonium blending: The quantity of the blend that shall continue to be safeguarded shall be such that its weight, when multiplied by the square of the weight fraction of contained fissionable isotopes, is not less than the weight of originally safeguarded plutonium multiplied by the square of the weight fraction of fissionable isotopes therein, provided however that:
(i) In cases where the weight of the whole blend, when multiplied by the square of the weight fraction of contained fissionable isotopes, is less than the weight of originally safeguarded plutonium multiplied by the square of the weight fraction of fissionable isotopes therein, the whole of the blend shall be safeguarded; and
(ii) The number of fissionable atoms in the portion of the blend that shall continue to be under safeguards shall in no case be less than the number of fissionable atoms in the originally safeguarded plutonium;
(b) Uranium/uranium blending: The quantity of the blend that shall continue to be safeguarded shall be such that the number of effective kilograms is not less than the number of effective kilograms in the originally safeguarded uranium, provided however that:
(i) In cases where the number of effective kilograms in the whole blend is less than in the safeguarded uranium, the whole of the blend shall be safeguarded; and
(ii) The number of fissionable atoms in the portion of the blend that shall continue to be under safeguards shall in no case be less than the number of fissionable atoms in the originally safeguarded uranium;
(c) Uranium/plutonium blending: The whole of the resultant blend shall be safeguarded until the uranium and the plutonium constituents are separated. After separation of the uranium and plutonium, safeguards shall apply to the originally safeguarded component; and
(d) Due account shall be taken of any processing losses agreed upon between the State and the Agency.
IV. AGENCY INSPECTORS
97. The provisions of paragraphs 1 to 10 and 12 to 14, inclusive, of the Inspectors Document shall apply to Agency inspectors performing functions pursuant to this Agreement. However, paragraph 4 of the Inspectors Document shall not apply with regard to any facility or to nuclear material to which the Agency has access at all times. The actual procedures to implement paragraph 60 of this Agreement shall be agreed to between the Agency and India.
98. The relevant provisions of the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Agency (INFCIRC/9/Rev.2) shall apply to the Agency, its inspectors performing functions under this Agreement and to any property of the Agency used by them in the performance of their functions under this Agreement.
V. PHYSICAL PROTECTION
99. India shall take all suitable measures necessary for the physical protection of the facilities and nuclear material subject to this Agreement, taking into account the recommendations made in Agency’s document INFCIRC/225/Rev.4, as may be amended from time to time.
VI. SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL
100. India shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of all items subject to safeguards under this Agreement, in accordance with provisions to be set out in the Subsidiary Arrangements.
VII. FINANCE
101. India and the Agency shall each bear any expense incurred in the implementation of their responsibilities under this Agreement. The Agency shall reimburse India for any special expenses, including those referred to in paragraph 6 of the Inspectors Document, incurred by India or persons under its jurisdiction at the written request of the Agency, if India notified the Agency before the expense was incurred that reimbursement would be required. These provisions shall not prejudice the allocation of expenses attributable to a failure by either India or the Agency to comply with this Agreement.
102. India shall ensure that any protection against third party liability, including any insurance or other financial security, in respect of a nuclear incident occurring in a facility under its jurisdiction shall apply to the Agency and its inspectors when carrying out their functions under this Agreement as that protection applies to nationals of India.
VIII. NON-COMPLIANCE
103. If the Board determines in accordance with Article XII.C of the Statute of the Agency that there has been any non-compliance by India with this Agreement, the Board shall call upon India to remedy such non-compliance forthwith, and shall make such reports as it deems appropriate. In the event of failure by India to take full remedial action within a reasonable time, the Board may take any other measures provided for in Article XII.C of the Statute. The Agency shall promptly notify India in the event of any determination by the Board pursuant in this regard.
IX. COOPERATION, INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
104. The Agency and India shall cooperate to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement.
105. At the request of either India or the Agency, there shall be consultations about any question arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement. India and the Agency shall endeavour to settle by negotiation any dispute arising from the interpretation or application of this Agreement. India shall have the right to request that any question arising out of the interpretation or application of the Agreement be considered by the Board. The Board shall invite India to participate in the discussion of any such question by the Board.
106. In the event of any question or questions arising from the implementation of this Agreement, the Agency shall provide India with an opportunity to clarify and facilitate the resolution of such questions. The Agency shall not draw any conclusions in connection with the question or questions until India has had an opportunity to provide clarifications.
X. FINAL CLAUSES
107. India and the Agency shall, at the request of either of them, consult about amending this Agreement.
108. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the Agency receives from India written notification that India’s statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met.
109. This Agreement shall remain in force until, in accordance with its provisions, safeguards have been terminated on all items subject to this Agreement, or until terminated by mutual agreement of the parties to this Agreement.
XI. DEFINITIONS
110. “Agency” means the International Atomic Energy Agency.
111. “Board” means the Board of Governors of the Agency.
112. “Campaign” means the period during which the chemical processing equipment in a reprocessing plant is operated between two successive wash-outs of the nuclear material present in the equipment.
113. “Conversion plant” means a facility (excepting a mine or ore-processing plant) to improve unirradiated nuclear material, or irradiated nuclear material that has been separated from fission products, by changing its chemical or physical form so as to facilitate further use or processing. The term conversion plant includes the facility’s storage and analytical sections. The term does not include a plant intended for separating the isotopes of nuclear material.
114. “Director General” means the Director General of the Agency.
115. “Effective kilograms” means:
(i) In the case of plutonium, its weight in kilograms;
(ii) In the case of uranium with an enrichment of 0.01 (1 %) and above, its weight in kilograms multiplied by the square of its enrichment;
(iii) In the case of uranium with an enrichment below 0.01 (1 %) and above 0.005 (0.5 %), its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.0001; and
(iv) In the case of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5 %) or below, and in the case of thorium, its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.00005.
116. “Enrichment plant” means a plant for separating the isotopes of nuclear material.
117. “Facility” means, for the purposes of this Agreement:
(i) A “principal nuclear facility”, which means a reactor, a plant for processing nuclear material irradiated in a reactor, a plant for separating the isotopes of a nuclear material, a plant for processing or fabricating nuclear material (excepting a mine or ore-processing plant) or a facility or plant of such other type as may be designated by the Board from time to time, including associated storage facilities, as well as a critical facility or a separate storage installation;
(ii) A research and development facility as defined in paragraph 127 of this Agreement;
(iii) Any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is customarily used;
(iv) A plant for the upgrading of heavy water or a separate storage installation for heavy water.
118. “Fuel fabrication plant” means a plant to manufacture fuel elements or other components containing nuclear material and includes the plant’s storage and analytical sections.
119. “Improved” means, with respect to nuclear material, that either:
(i) The concentration of fissionable isotopes in it has been increased; or
(ii) The amount of chemically separable fissionable isotopes in it has been increased; or
(iii) Its chemical or physical form has been changed so as to facilitate further use or processing.
120. “Inspector” means an Agency official designated in accordance with the Inspectors Document.
121. “Inspectors Document” means the Annex to the Agency’s document GC(V)/INF/39.
122. “Nuclear material” means any source or special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the Statute.
123. “Produced, processed or used” means any utilization or any alteration of the physical or chemical form or composition, including any change of the isotopic composition, of nuclear material;
124. “Project agreement” means a safeguards agreement relating to an Agency project and containing provisions as foreseen in Article XI.F.4.(b) of the Statute.
125. “Reactor” means any device in which a controlled, self-sustaining fission chain-reaction can be maintained.
126. “Reprocessing plant” means a facility to separate irradiated nuclear materials and fission products, and includes the facility’s head-end treatment section and its associated storage and analytical sections. This term is synonymous with the term “a plant for processing nuclear material irradiated in a reactor” which is used in paragraph 117 of this Agreement.
127. “Research and development facility” means a facility, other than a principal nuclear facility, used for research or development in the field of nuclear energy.
128. “Statute” means the Statute of the Agency.
129. “Throughput” means the rate at which nuclear material is introduced into a facility operating at full capacity.
130. “Unilaterally submitted” means submitted by India to Agency safeguards.

DONE at Vienna, on the …………………….day of ……………………….. 2008,
in duplicate, in the English language.

For the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA:

For the INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY:

ANNEX

LIST OF FACILITIES SUBJECT TO SAFEGUARDS UNDER THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO CIVILIAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES

FACILITY OFFERED FOR SAFEGUARDS BY INDIA DATE OF RECEIPT OF NOTIFICATION

MISRULE IN ORISSA: A SAMPLE

Subhas Chandra Pattanayak

For us to say Orissa is in the grip of dishonest fellows is not new. New for us is that we are not alone. Slowly but steadily many others have started seeing how scoundrels are ruling the roost in Orissa. A sample of this new awakening has hit the police, which, after absorbing the initial jolt of predicament generated by overwhelming material documents against top authorities like the Chief Secretary and the Chief Minister, has at last stated to start investigations.

The crux of the issue is a corruption that Biju regime had started and Navin regime has completed!

It is a single case; but a representative case of nexus domination over administration.

A man was illegally appointed as a manager under the Bhubaneswar Development Authority (BDA) in the rank of a Deputy Secretary to Government on 23 April 1994 when Biju Patnaik was the Chief Minister. It was one of many illegalities done during his time.

The person that used the top corridor of Orissa Secretariat to bag the appointment was not qualified for the post. His deficiency was kept a secret and he continued to draw salaries of Deputy Secretary to government.

Comfortably placed, he longed for a promotion specifically as the Pay Commission was likely to sumptuously enlarge pay packages for officials. This made BDA peruse his personal file that brought to attention of the concerned officer the lacunae in his appointment. Then attempts were made to regularize his appointment by obtaining post- facto approval of the Government.

Unavoidably, the file went to the Secretary of Law. The law department refused to recommend for post-facto approval of the illegal appointment and returned the file on 27 February 2007 to the administrative department of Urban Development (UD). The illegalities in appointment having thus been bared by the department of Law, on 8 March 2007, the Special Secretary, UD department put up the matter before the departmental secretary with his observations that the appointment should be nullified and penal prosecution should be initiated against persons responsible for this illegal appointment and swindling of salaries. The Secretary endorsed it to the Chief Secretary on 13 March 2007.
The Chief Secretary, Ajit Kumar Tripathy, accepted the Law department interpretations and approved the views of the Special Secretary of UD and passed orders for fixation of responsibility for the illegality committed. In his note dated 17 March 2007, Tripathy said, “Government need not take lenient view to regularize irregularities like this. Continuance for long periods is no ground for this. I fully agree with the views of Law department. No further action is called for except fixing of responsibility for such action, which should be done”.

But Tripathy had hardly imagined that no illegality done during Biju Patnaik’s Chiefministership could ever be allowed to be shown on records as illegal during the Chiefministership of his son Navin.

His order for fixation of responsibility was treated with the contempt honesty attracts in a climate of dishonesty.

He was forced not to look at previous pages of the concerned file when that should come to his table again.

And, the file, sans compliance of his orders for responsibility fixation came to his table again with recommendation of UD Secretary dated 15 December 2007 for post-facto approval of the appointment viewed as illegal by the department of Law.

Tripathy did not look at the previous pages and endorsed the file to UD Minister, noting as if on dotted lines the words, “as proposed”. The copy of the note-sheet produced here below is suggestive of the tremendous mental trauma that Tripathy was subjected to at that moment. He seems to have deviated from his practice of putting the date below his signature after writing “as proposed”. By simply writing, “as proposed” he had indicated that he had to sign the file on dotted lines. Therefore the file had to return to him from the UD Minister with off the records instructions to express his clear willingness for post-facto approval of the appointment he had earlier refused to approve.
And, Tripathy had to write again, “The justifications are convincing and it is in interest of the organization”. Then the file passed the UD Minister and then the Chief Minister gladly regularized the irregularity committed in his father’s regime.

The person concerned who is now regularized must have enjoyed utmost sadistic pleasure by seeing Tripathy shallow his own bitter pill.

Such a situation hits a State only when the scoundrels rule the roost.

But now, Tripathy is to face the music for not having adhered to principle, as a social activist outfit Kalinga Sena has raised the issue of corruption that the police has taken cognizance of.

EVOLUTION

(Continuing discussion on Sri Jagannatha)

Subhas Chandra Pattanayak

As everywhere, tribal people of Orissa, marveled by agro-magic, were matriarch in outlook and were worshiping Mother Nature in whom they were seeing the factor of creation. To facilitate permanency of the object of worship they had developed the habit of worshiping wooden logs roughly designing the same in the pattern of woman’s torso. They were calling such a wooden torso as Jaganta.

To the simple tribal mind, child was being created in the womb of a mother and therefore, female torso was the source of creation of life. Therefore this Jaganta was representing the female torso that stood for giving birth. But birth was meaningless without life. The newborn was to live. And to live, the breasts of the mother provide the initial and basic source. Orissa’s tribes call the breasts as Thana, in short, Tha. Hence the tribal of Orissa gave prominence to the two breasts of a mother in the wooden torso of the female they were worshiping as Jaganta and started calling this Tha– painted torso as Jaganta-Tha. Doyen amongst the Chaurasi Siddhas, Sabaripa, author of the oldest Baudha Doha, was worshiping Jaganta-Tha in the village Chaurashi near Kakatapur, which belong to the Kurma Pataka Pur. Agents of Brahmanism who had conspired to wipe out the Buddha connection of Sri Jagannath have misprojected this Sabaripa as Sabar Biswabasu.

Jaganta-Tha was developed into Jagannath by Orissa’s Buddhist king Indrabhuti, founder of Vajrayana, who being a master social philosopher of his days, had been successful in superimposing Buddha, as the Guru and the protector of Oriya culture on Sabaripa’s Jaganta-Tha and then had begun his scripture Gnyana Siddhi with salutations to Jagannatha, the new form of Buddha, the Master.

So, it is Indrabhuti, who, in order to overcome the impact of the idol worshiping that was found more advantageous to Vedic imperialism than the theosophy of void relied to the Mahayana sect, tried to transform the omnipresence of Buddha to a form of physical presence for better concentration of the followers of Buddha by transforming Jaganta-Tha to Jagannatha.

By coining the word ‘Jagannatha’ he projected Buddha as the Supreme one amongst all the deities conceived and propitiated by anybody till then and made it clear that this new word stands for Buddha, the ‘Guru’ as is seen in Gnyana Siddhi. He then proceeded to provide the formulas for achieving ‘Siddhi’ of His worship. In the process he built up an environment of worship of female deities in total contrast to spread of male deities by Vedic propagandists. He developed the tenets of Vajrayana in consonance with the original Buddhist identification of the female factor as the cause of creation as against the male factor speculated by Vedas.

He therefore contemplated the idol of Jagannatha in the form of a female, in consonance with the concepts of Sabaripa.

Sabar tribes of Orissa to which Sabaripa perhaps belonged, known colloquially as Sauras, have a tradition since ancient days that helps us understand how agro-magic had shaped up the thinking process of our people and culminated in the cult of Jagannatha.

After mangoes in Orissa ripe suggesting that the rainy season is not far away, Sauras get ready to indulge in matriarch festivities. The mother earth would soon indulge in union with the clouds and be pregnant with the new crops. To them, their village deity embodies mother earth. She is Jaganta, she is also Jalia deriving this name from Jala (water, the clouds would bring). They erect a small chariot with four wheels representing four clouds (Chari Megha) and putting her along with Dharmagoja and Kitumg as her companion they drag the chariot to the village junction in a procession with members of both the genders dancing to drum beats. These deities are made of wooden logs and resemble female torsos with round eyes painted in their upper parts resembling breasts in female bodies. The personal belongings of the village deity are kept in a new basket made of Bamboo and are carried by a bearer along with the procession. She stays in her camp house for six days and then, in the same style and in the same sort of a procession returns to her permanent abode.

This tribal practice is discernible in the car festival of Sri Jagannatha.

Agents of Brahminism have misled the people by misappropriating both Sabaripa and Indrabhuti and projecting them in the labyrinth of legends as Sabara Biswabasu and Indradyumna respectively in order to show Jagannatha as an Arya deity. But, they have never succeeded in eliminating or suppressing its tribal origin. (To be continued)